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Introduction 
In the year 2000, the heads of state and 
government of the EU15 convened in the city of 
Lisbon to solemnly declare that the EU would 
become the ‘most competitive’ economy in the 
world by 2010. The way to achieve this 
ambitious goal seemed clear: Europe needed to 
bring more people to work and make them more 
productive. This was easier said than done! After 
more than half of the time available to reach this 
lofty goal has elapsed, it is clear that the EU is 
definitely not on its way to becoming the most 
competitive economy in the world. In terms of 
productivity, the EU has clearly not only fallen 
even further behind the US (the implicit benchmark 
in most areas), but its record post-Lisbon has 
actually deteriorated, compared to the 1980s or 
1990s.  
 
* Daniel Gros is Director of CEPS. Many thanks to 
Funda Celikel-Esser for excellent research assistance. 
The deeper causes of the absolute and relative 
deterioration of productivity growth in the EU are 
still under discussion. Most economists assign part of 
the blame to insufficient investment and another part 
to an inexplicable residual factor called ‘total factor 
productivity’ growth. The relative weights one should 
assign to these two factors are still under discussion, 
but it appears that 50:50 (one half insufficient 
investment and one half ‘we do not know’) 
constitutes a good characterisation of the research 
results available so far. 
More progress seems to have been made in terms of 
the other key Lisbon target, namely to reach an 
employment rate of 70% by the year 2010. Over the 
last six years, the employment rate (those employed 
as a percentage of the working age population) has 
indeed crept up by about 2 percentage points, from 
around 62% to 64-5%, but progress has been too 
slow to bring the Lisbon target within reach by the 
end of the decade.  
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Abstract 
More than half way into the decade, it is clear that the ambitious goal to make the EU the ‘most 
competitive economy’ by 2010 will be missed. This contribution shows that investing more in education 
would be the key in terms of employment, a central element in the Lisbon goal. Improving the skills of 
the EU’s population would have, inter alia, a direct impact on the employment rate. Reaching the Lisbon 
goal of an employment rate of 70% would be possible even without labour market reforms if the average 
level of qualification of the EU were to reach the benchmarks in this area (which in turn are very close to 
the values reached by the best performing member states). 
The data also show that the modest improvement in employment rates that has taken place in recent years 
is entirely due to a small but significant upgrading of the skill level of the EU population. There is no 
sign that labour markets had any impact. 
The key importance of education and skills has been reiterated in many official documents; but close to 
nothing has been done to speed up the pace of change. This is another example of how the Lisbon agenda 
has remained an empty list of good intentions. 
A higher proportion of university graduates is evidently also a precondition for increasing R&D 
spending. It will take probably another generation before the share of the work force with tertiary 
education has reached the level (around 30%) required to make it worthwhile to spend the 3% of GDP on 
R&D set by the Lisbon agenda. Putting Europe at the forefront of technology will take more than a few 
years. 2 | Daniel Gros 
 
This contribution looks at an aspect that is often 
forgotten: namely the link between skills and 
employment. It shows that the key problem of Europe 
in terms of employment is not so much the structure 
of its labour markets, but the insufficient skill levels 
of its population. Let us consider two key findings: 
1)  The small improvement in the overall 
employment ratio that has taken place since 
Lisbon can entirely be explained by an ongoing 
change in the skill composition of Europe’s 
labour force. Labour market reform does not 
seem to have had any impact on employment 
ratios.  
2)  If the European work force had the same skill 
composition as the US (or some more advanced 
member countries), the employment rate in 
Europe could easily reach the Lisbon goal even 
without any labour market reforms. 
The main policy conclusion is that the key to dealing 
with Europe’s structural problems is to increase the 
level of education of its work force. Some progress is 
happening on this front as a result of a general 
increase in the investment in schooling that has taken 
place over the last decades. However, this ongoing 
‘automatic’ improvement in skill levels is proceeding 
very slowly. There has been virtually no acceleration 
since 2000 and almost none of the more specific 
benchmarks set in the context of the Lisbon agenda is 
likely to be reached by the end of this decade. 
More investment in education will thus deal with the 
low employment rates which constitute one key 
structural weakness for Europe. More education has 
been shown in innumerable studies to increase 
growth as well. More education thus brings at least a 
double dividend: 1) even with rather rigid labour 
markets, it leads to higher employment. 2) Increasing 
the human capital of the population raises the growth 
rate. Moreover, increasing investment in higher 
education is also a pre-condition to ensure that the 
increase in R&D spending in Europe called for by the 
Lisbon agenda actually leads to more ideas being 
produced and not just an increase in the salaries of 
those qualified for this type of occupation. There are 
thus at least three channels through which higher 
investment in education fosters growth. 
This contribution deals only with the first channel or 
aspect. It starts by providing some simple 
background information on the link between 
employment and skill levels. It then analyses the 
progress that is taking place and provides evidence 
that without increased efforts it would take Europe 
generations to achieve it own goals. It also 
documents briefly the importance of the link between 
education and R&D spending, which suggests that 
reaching the 3% of GDP target set for the latter will 
make sense only in about a generation, i.e. when 
there are enough knowledge workers around to 
conduct much more research. 
This paper does not deal with the very interesting 
special situation of the new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Their education levels 
are in most cases at least as good as those of the old 
EU15 and their growth rates have now been 2-3 
percentage points higher. However, their GDP per 
capita is still much lower and their employment rates 
are also lower than in the EU15. This combination of 
differences suggests that the new member countries 
are still engaged in a catching-up process and that the 
even lower employment rates are due to the fact that 
the older part of the population had learned skills that 
are of little value in the new environment of an open 
market economy. The remainder thus deals only with 
the ‘old’ EU15, which still account for over 90% of 
the GDP of the EU25 and 80% of its population. 
1.  Employment and skill levels: The 
forgotten link 
The official mantra is that reforms, especially labour 
market reforms, are needed to reach this goal. The 
Lisbon employment target was chosen because 
implicitly the aim was catch up with the US in terms 
of employment rates. The presumption was that 
Europe needed to price its marginal groups, 
especially the lower qualified, into its labour markets. 
It is true that the employment rate in Europe is low 
because some groups participate only weakly in the 
labour market, but it is not widely appreciated that 
the EU15 has actually a slightly better (or rather less 
bad) record than the US in providing jobs for the less 
skilled. As a matter of fact, the employment rate for 
those with less than upper secondary skill levels is 
higher in the EU (49.2%) than in the US (43.0%). 
The problem of the EU is thus not mainly that the 
lower skilled cannot not find a job in a rigid labour 
market, but rather that there are far too many of the 
low skilled: over one-third (35.6% of the population 
in working age) in the EU has not even completed 
upper secondary education against around one-fifth 
(21.3%) in the US. 
US employment rates are only marginally higher than 
those in the EU among the higher skilled. The big 
difference here is the fact that in the US the 
proportion of the working age population with higher 
skills is about a quarter higher than in Europe: over 
26% of the US population has tertiary education 
(university level) compared to around 21% for the 
EU.
4 
                                                        
4 International comparisons of skill levels are inherently 
difficult because of differences in national education 
systems. Different sources give somewhat different 
numbers, but the broad picture is the same across all Employment and Competitiveness | 3 
 
Table 1. Education and employment (2004) 
  Share of 
population 
Employment 
rates 
 EU15  US    EU15  US 
Below upper 
secondary 35.6  21.3  49.2  43.0 
Upper secondary  43.8  52.3  70.1  71.1 
Tertiary 20.6  26.5  82.5  82.9 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat and OECD data. 
2.  Progress so far 
Given the large differences in the employment ratios 
at different skill levels documented so far, it is clear 
that the evolution of the overall employment ratio 
will depend not only on labour market reforms, but 
also on changes in the skill composition of the 
potential work force. An increase in the share of the 
higher skilled should lead to a higher employment 
rate even in the absence of reforms simply because 
the higher skilled tend to have a higher employment 
rate.  
Table 2 below provides the relevant data for the five-
year period 1999-2004. The last row gives the overall 
employment ratio for the EU15 in 1999 and 2004. 
This overall ratio has increased from 62.0 to 64.5, 
and thus by a small, but non-negligible amount over 
these five years. However, looking at the 
employment rates by skill levels give a different 
picture: for the lowest of the three skill levels 
considered here the employment rate has actually 
declined. The decline has been very small, but there 
has definitely been no improvement as for the overall 
ratio. The conclusion is clear: the overall 
employment ratio has increased mainly because the 
share of the lower skills has declined over this period. 
Labour market reforms inspired by the Lisbon agenda 
should have increased the employment rates of the 
lowest skills, but the opposite has been the case. 
Table 2. Education and employment: What has 
improved since Lisbon? 
  Share of 
population  
Employment 
rates 
  1999 2004 Change 1999 2004 Change
Below 
upper 
secondary 
39.4 35.6  -3.8  49.6 49.2  -0.4 
Upper 
secondary  42.3 43.8  +1.5  69.0 70.1  +1.1 
Tertiary 18.3    20.6  +2.3  81.8 82.5  +0.7 
Overall NA  NA  NA  62.0  64.5  +2.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
                                                                                       
sources: employment rates are very similar on both 
sides of the Atlantic within most skill categories, but the 
skill composition of the population is quite different, 
with a much higher proportion of the US population 
having higher skills. 
3.  What would a ‘better educated’ Europe 
look like? 
A simple thought experiment can illustrate the 
importance of raising the skill level for the EU-US 
comparison: assuming that there are no reforms in 
EU labour markets, one can assume that the 
employment rates by skills should remain roughly 
constant even if the skill composition of the 
population changes. One can then ask what would be 
the EU employment ratio if the EU population had, 
on average, the same composition in terms of 
qualification levels as that of the US. The answer is 
simple: the employment rate in the EU should be 
roughly equal to that of the US (and rather close to 
70%).  
This simple result derives from the fact that the 
employment rates in different skill groups are quite 
similar in the EU(-15) and the US. As already 
mentioned above, the employment rate for those with 
less than upper secondary education is actually 
somewhat higher in the EU. But the difference is 
rather small and this is also the case for other skill 
levels.  
Table 3 below shows the present shares of the 
population in the EU at different skill levels as well 
as the Lisbon benchmark in rounded numbers 
The key challenges are at the lowest and the highest 
level: In the EU around 35% of the population does 
not have upper secondary education, whereas the 
Lisbon target (of course initially only for the youths) 
is less than half of this, i.e. 15%. Part of the mirror 
image of this is that around 30% of the population 
should have a tertiary (university) education, against 
only 20% at present. As will be documented below, 
this corresponds to the share of the youngest cohorts 
that has this level of educational attainment in the 
EU15 at present (the EU25 numbers would be very 
similar). 
As for the employment rates by skill class: there is no 
particular benchmark so that this example uses the 
actual numbers which are very quite similar on both 
sides of the Atlantic: around 50% for the lowest skill 
class, compared to around (mostly above) 80% for 
the highest skill class (those with university degrees). 
Table 3. Education and employment: A thought 
experiment based on stylised facts 
  Share of population 
(rounded) 
Typical employment 
rates (rounded) 
  EU15  Benchmark  EU15 = US 
Below upper 
secondary  35 15  50 
Upper 
secondary  45 55  70   
Tertiary  20   30  80  
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data. 4 | Daniel Gros 
 
With its present skill composition, the EU has an 
employment rate of around 65% (as can be verified 
by summing the products of the first and the third 
column). However, if the EU improved the skill level 
of its population to its own benchmark (which is 
close to that reached in some Scandinavian 
countries), the employment rate should go to 70%. 
The basic mechanism is quite simple: increasing the 
share of the population with at least upper secondary 
education by 10 percentage points (and reducing that 
of the level below) yields a gain of 2 percentage 
points in terms of the overall employment ratio, 
because the employment rate of those with upper 
secondary education is 20 points higher than those 
with below upper secondary (70% vs. roughly 50%). 
Increasing the share of those with tertiary education 
also by 10% leads to a further gain of around 3 
percentage points because the employment rate of 
this skill level is 30 points higher than those with 
below upper secondary. 
There are of course wide variation among member 
countries in terms of their overall employment rates. 
However, there is much less variance in the 
differences of the employment rates across skill 
levels. The lower skilled have lower employment 
rates in all member countries, suggesting that raising 
the skill level should have a positive impact on 
employment everywhere. It might also be the case 
that in some member countries there is little scope for 
further increasing the skill level of the population (at 
least in terms of formal qualifications). This might be 
the case for Scandinavians, and possibly the British, 
but for the EU, and in particular its core, namely 
France and Germany, there is certainly still a lot of 
room to improve the skill level of the population, 
increasing the number of university graduates and 
radically lowering the numbers of those without even 
upper secondary education. 
How realistic is it to expect that employment rates 
would stay high for people with tertiary education if 
their supply increases massively? The experience of 
most EU member countries actually suggests that 
there is no negative correlation at all between an 
increased supply of workers with higher education 
and their employment rates. Those countries that 
have seen over the last decade the strongest increase 
in the supply of people with tertiary education have 
also experienced the highest increase in their 
employment rates. Overall, the cross-country 
correlation between the change in the share of the 
population with tertiary education and the change in 
their employment rates has been strongly positive, 
suggesting that improving the education level does 
not lead to unemployed academics.  
4.  Is Europe improving? 
It was already shown above that the skill level of the 
population is improving in Europe because the new 
cohorts entering the labour market have in general a 
higher skill level than the older ones. 
Figure 1 shows how the share of the lowest skills is 
indeed increasing with the age of the cohort. 
Figure 1. Low skilled as a percentage of the population by age bracket
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
19-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69
Age bracket
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
u
p
p
e
r
 
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
Below upper secondary average (15-64 year old)
 Employment and Competitiveness | 5 
 
It is straightforward to determine where the average 
education level of the EU15 is heading if one 
assumes that all new cohorts have the same level of 
skills as the most recent one: in this case, the average 
for the entire work force would over time converge to 
that level. This would imply that given present 
trends, the share of the population that does not have 
upper secondary education would tend towards a 
value around 20%, which is above the Lisbon target. 
Moreover, this target would be reached 
(asymptotically) only in about two generations (some 
time between 2030 and 2050). Progress can thus be 
expected, but it comes at a snail’s pace. 
Moreover, the Lisbon target of halving the number of 
young people who do not finish upper secondary 
education is very likely to be missed. The proportion 
of the 19-24 years old who did not attain this level of 
qualification has stayed at around 24% since 2000 
(the first year with reliable data). 
At the other end of the skill scale, the data provide 
more encouragement. As Figure 2 shows, the share of 
the younger generation that has attained tertiary 
educational levels is now close to 30%. This implies 
that over time the average should also tend towards 
this level.
5 But, as already mentioned above, it will 
take two generations before the average will reach 
this level. 
                                                        
5 For a more detailed forward-looking analysis of the 
evolution of education levels based on enrolment data, 
see Andrea Montanino and Bartosz Przywara and David 
Young (2004), “Investment in education: The 
implications for economic growth and public finances”, 
Commission of the European Communities, DG ECFIN, 
Economic Papers No. 217. 
Figure 2. Higher education by age in Europe
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5.  Education and R&D 
The link between education and R&D is self evident: 
without more scientists, it does not make sense to 
increase spending on R&D. This is why it is pointless 
to focus on a target like ‘increasing R&D spending to 
3% of GP by 2010’. This would mean an increase in 
spending of around 60% and it is not likely that it is 
possible to increase the number of the so-called 
‘knowledge workers’ within a few years by this 
percentage. As shown above, there has been a 
gradual improvement in the sense that in younger 
cohorts the proportion of those with tertiary 
education has now reached 30%, which represents an 
improvement of around 50% over the values of a 
generation earlier (the 29+ vs. the 49+).  
The link between R&D spending and higher 
education is also apparent in the data, displayed in 
Figure 3 which shows that across member countries 
there is a strong correlation between R&D spending 
as a percentage of GDP and the share of the 
population that has a tertiary education. Given that 
the definition of what constitutes expenditure on 
R&D differs considerably across countries, it is not 
surprising that some countries show considerably 
higher (or lower) propensities to spend on R&D than 
others with similar education levels. But the 
correlation is still evident in the data. Moreover, the 
trend line suggests a simple rule of thumb: across 
countries a 10 percentage point increase in the share 
of university graduates in the population is associated 
with a 1% increase in the share of R&D spending by 
1% of GDP. Thus, the target of spending 3% of GDP 
on R&D on average for the EU will probably be 
reached (and become appropriate) only when around 
30% of the workforce has a tertiary education. But, as 
documented above, this will take more than a 
generation to achieve. 
Figure 3. R &D expenditure and share of highly skilled
BE NL
UK
DK
ES
IE
FI
SE
FR
DE
GR
AT
PT
IT
y = 0.09x
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
8 1 31 82 32 83 3
Share of high skilled in population
R
 
&
 
D
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
a
s
 
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
R&D 2004 Linear (R&D 2004)
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This contribution has concentrated on the one area 
where some progress has been made towards the 
Lisbon goals, namely that of employment, which has 
increased somewhat over the last five years. 
However, it appears that very little of this 
improvement has been due to labour market reforms. 
Instead, what seems to have happened is that the skill 
composition of the EU’s population is slowly 
improving. Since the higher skilled have in general a 
much higher employment rate, any improvement in 
the skill composition leads automatically (i.e. even 
without reforms) to a higher employment rate.  
The ongoing improvement in the skill level of the 
EU’s population is not a reason to become 
complacent. At the slow pace at which it is 
proceeding, it will take almost two generations to 
start closing the transatlantic gap that exists in this 
area. 
The upgrading of the skill level of the European 
labour force is further slowed down by its 
unfavourable demographics. Obviously, the average 
skill level improves more quickly if each cohort is of 
the same size, than if each cohort is smaller than the 
preceding one. In those member countries where 
birth rates have settled at a value around 1.3, each Employment and Competitiveness | 7 
 
generation is 35% smaller than the preceding one. 
This implies that the improvement of the average 
skill level also proceeds at a correspondingly slower 
pace. The reduction in the effective working life that 
has taken place over the last decades in many 
member countries constitutes a further factor slowing 
down the improvement in skill levels. A shorter 
working life makes it less attractive to invest in 
human capital simply because the time period over 
which this capital can yield returns is then shorter. 
One key transatlantic difference that explains a large 
part of the difference in economic performance is the 
EU-US difference in terms of education levels. This 
difference is most marked at both ends of the 
spectrum: Europe has a much higher proportion of its 
population at the lowest level (below secondary 
education) and Europe has a much lower proportion 
at the highest level (namely tertiary education).
6 The 
weakness at the tertiary level also implies that it does 
not make sense to call for more spending on R&D. 
Additional spending in this area makes sense only 
when the supply of people who can actually 
undertake research has increased, but this will take a 
generation. 
                                                        
6 Unfortunately, the data are not good enough to 
document systematically that this difference at the 
tertiary level is most pronounced not just in tertiary 
education in general, but at the upper echelon of tertiary 
education, namely post-graduate studies. See Etienne 
Wasmer with Peter Fredriksson, Ana Lamo, Julián 
Messina and Giovanni Peri (2005), “The 
Macroeconomics of Education”, report prepared for the 
Seventh European Conference, of the Fondazione 
Rodolfo Debenedetti, Venice, 11 June 2005. 
The obvious question that follows is what should be 
done to increase the educational attainment of the EU 
population. This is in the first instance a 
responsibility of member states. Instead of signing 
solemn declarations at their annual spring summits, 
national leaders should get down to the more serious 
business of improving the education levels of their 
own people. This task has been neglected over the 
last decades and this is one of the key reasons why 
Europe’s economy is not performing well at present. 
Labour market reforms are always useful and 
welcome, but in the long run it is at least as important 
to foster investment in human capital. 
The EU is making a small contribution, for example, 
via its ERASMUS programme. But this programme 
has been cut under the compromise just agreed for 
the next seven-year budgetary framework. This 
shows once again the gulf between rhetoric and 
reality when it comes to the Lisbon programme. 
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